In this paper, we construct a complementary financialized business model of SME bio-pharma that reveals how the product innovation and development process conjoins with speculative forces in capital markets. To conceptualise this descriptive business model we employ three organising elements: narratives about pipeline progress that may (or may not) lead to additional funding from equity investors or other investing partners, capital market conditions that impact on the supply of funding and market valuations and the variable motivations of equity investors who are not in a development marathon but a relay race anxious to pass on ownership and extract higher returns on invested capital through realised market value. Bio-pharmas are, in effect, constituted as investment portfolios of innovations where products in pipeline and firms trade for shareholder value. In this speculative innovation, capital market liquidity business model complementary narratives and favourable capital market conditions are required to keep it all going.
Introduction
Investment in the creation of knowledge based assets through innovation and a high level of R&D spending is generally viewed as the key to maintaining relative corporate and national competitiveness, often summarised as closing the 'innovation gap'. The critical literature on financialization is concerned with how the demands of the capital market modify strategic priorities and corporate governance in an era of shareholder value creation where management and shareholder interests align (Froud et al., 2003; Andersson et al., 2007; Lazonick, 2008) . This literature exposes tensions and contradictions between the 'expectation' that innovation can transform corporate, industry and national economic performance, and 'outcomes' that tend to be more disappointing. Lazonick (2008) argues that in a financialized economy the short-run priorities of the capital market hold sway over productive and financial transformation because firms are encouraged to maximize their short-run returns to shareholders rather than re-invest in innovative new product development for future competitiveness. Froud et al., (2006) are concerned with how, in a financialized economy, the role of management becomes that of structuring narratives that flatter the outcomes of R&D spending to maintain the confidence of analysts and investors, and thus improve market valuations of firms' equity on the stock market in the absence of financial transformation. Lazonick and Tulum (2008) develop their general financialized account of 'downsize and distribute' more specifically in their paper on the US Bio-pharma (BP) industry.
"Since the 1980s the US business community, the BP industry included, has embraced the ideology that the performance of their companies and the economy are best served by the 'maximization of shareholder value'…" "It is an ideology that, among other things, says that any attempt by the government to interfere in the allocation of resources can only undermine economic performance. In practice, what shareholder ideology has meant for corporate resource allocation is that when companies reap more profits they spend a substantial proportion of them on stock repurchases in an effort to boost their stock prices, thus enriching first and foremost the corporate executives who make these allocative decisions" (p.4). Froud et al., (2006) , in their case study of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) observe that the pharma business model has less to do with R&D and product innovation and more to do with defensive mergers, corporate restructuring and narratives promising research productivity that ' has not yet come through in the numbers' (p.11). Gleadle & Haslam, (2010) note that narratives, in an R&D intensive medical diagnostics firm, are concerned with how R&D 'must pay for itself' and generate a return on investment to support analyst opinions about the share price.
The objective of this paper is to construct an alternative but complementary financialized account of the bio-pharma business model. Our alternative account departs both from productionist understandings of the potential of R&D and the perspective of Froud et al (2006) . Specifically, we argue that bio-pharma is an industry dependent on the capital market for funding because it is cash hungry until, is deployed to meet agreed milestones, for example, completing development, obtaining results from patient clinical testing and submitting a product for regulatory approval and possible commercialisation. Favourable milestone reports about product in pipeline will help increase the chances of securing additional funding which may be crucial not only for continued survival but also positively influencing analysts' opinions about stock market valuation for equity investors and incidentally helping to boost executive bonuses tied to the value of stock options. These options are more likely to be 'in the money' if a drug's development does progress from one phase to the next and towards final regulatory approval for the market. Positive milestone reports move products along the pipeline towards regulatory approval reducing the risk of failure and mitigating investor losses on their equity investments.
Milestone reports are also (but not always) opportunities for a firm's existing investors to exit and new investors to enter because market values tend to adjust favourably after milestone announcements creating better conditions for buy and sell side transactions to be executed. As a result, individual investors tend to focus on different pipeline phases for their portfolio investments. Venture capital investors, for example, can exit via an initial placement offer (IPO), which results in a public listing on the stock market or they may sell on to a partner, such as a Big-Pharma 2 or a private equity partnership seeking a potential return on investment. In this financialized business model, the investor is not participating in a marathon but instead, competing in a relay where handing the baton on to the next investor secures a (possible) realised gain on invested equity funds. Bio-pharma investment is a speculative bet on scientific discoveries and is similar, in this respect to oil, gas and mineral exploration where Federal Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory approval is like striking oil or finding the seam.
In this paper we employ an innovation, capital market liquidity conceptual framework to organize our understanding of the Financialized bio-pharma business model. This conceptual framework emphasises how complementary narratives about pipeline progress conjoin with capital market conditions and demands. Favourable milestone reports coupled with capital market liquidity help to inflate analyst's expectations about market valuations and promote entry and exit opportunities for equity investors looking to extract a positive return on speculative investment. We explore the operation of this financialized business model in three UK small, medium enterprise (SME) bio-pharmas.
Constructing a financialized bio-pharma business model
Both government policy documents and the academic literature identify the potential of the creative and innovative sectors to transform economic growth and national competitiveness. (Porter, 1990; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; DCMS 1998 DCMS , 2001 Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2003; Mazzucato & Dosi, 2006; Lazonick, 2008) . The general argument is that productive investment in innovation can strengthen corporate financial performance and thus transform industry and national economic competitiveness. Investment in knowledge development and commitment to high levels of R&D spending are essential to maintaining competitiveness and closing the 'innovation-gap.'
"Investment in research, leading to innovation and productive benefit to the economy, is a major concern for governments around the world, and a high priority for the European Union. Currently, the EU has considerable strengths, yet invests about a third less than the US and the innovation-capital market gap has not narrowed in recent years". "Red (pharmaceutical) bio-pharmacology is a prime example of the sort of knowledge-driven industry that the government has been so keen to encourage and the lessons drawn here will be relevant to other high-technology industries making products with long gestation periods" (p.5).
Over the last thirty years, global bio-pharma has attracted more than $300 billion in capital funds (Pisano, 2006a) into a science based business model. This business model according to Pisano(2006b, p.116) GlaxoSmithKline (GSK).
The SME bio-pharma sector became an investment opportunity for venture capital and private equity investors because Big-Pharma ultimately needs to develop new products either in-house or procure products developed externally to replenish their pipelines as many existing products are coming out of patent. Ernst and Young (2009) http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:bNHLXjol1C4J:www.nerac.com /download.php%3Fid%3D175+bio+pharma+business+model&hl=en&gl=uk
The SME bio-pharma business model has been further legitimised because BigPharma has started to emulate small cash strapped bio-pharma companies and http://www.gsk.com/investors/reps08/GSK-Report-2008-full.pdf
The SME bio-pharma sector has benefited from government funding into universities (McMillan et al., 2000) through knowledge transfer, company spin offs and R&D tax credits. In some cases, the commercial ventures established retain links to medical research centres and universities through a strategic alliance or else contractual arrangements that out-source the R&D work back to the university (Robinson and Stuart, 2001; Standing et al., 2008) . Venture capital (VC) partnerships and private investors, sensing financial opportunity, have channelled significant funding into SME bio-pharma. Bio-pharmas that do manage their innovation process, to create new product from their technical platform(s) and either move towards or achieve regulatory approval, can increase the probability of leveraging returns on invested capital. This is because the perceived financial risk, and thus investors' required return on investment, is reduced as milestones are met along the route to regulatory approval. Source:
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/aim/aim.htm http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/aim/aim.htm
It is possible to construct a 'productionist' business model of SME bio-pharma, one that places emphasis on the importance of R&D and innovation as part of a resource based view (RBV) of the firm where the object is to transform R&D spending and acquired knowledge into unique intangible assets to enable an above average financial return. (Porter, 1990; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; DCMS 1998 DCMS , 2001 Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2003; Mazzucato & Dosi, 2006; Lazonick, 2008) . In this productionist bio-pharma business model, the development of ethically approved drugs requires a combination of: technical ingenuity, financial resource and patient shareholder investment because product development takes place over decades not years (see Hopkins, 2007) . In start-up SME bio-pharmas, narratives about productive achievement take on increased importance in the absence of commercially driven financial information about revenue, expenses and return on capital. These narratives relate to a specific drug development outcome, trial and patient test results communicated in the form of milestone reports. Favourable reports might encourage equity investors to provide additional follow-on funding or result in payments from partners relating to milestone agreements. Positive narratives may also inflate analyst expectations about future cash funding and thus the market value of shareholder equity (see Newberry and Robb, 2008) . It is very much a speculative business model where narratives about potential discovery operate as a substitute for actual discovery in setting stage payments and establishing the basis for market expectations and perception of market value.
Capital market conditions matter especially with regard to maintaining the flow of follow-on equity funding into a financial value chain that is fragmented and the calculations and motivations of investors, variable. For example, there are complex trade off's between raising additional follow-on equity funding and the dilution of existing equity stakes. The average bio-pharma firm is perhaps best viewed as a portfolio of products at various phases of development where a funding deal can attach to individual products or firms. Obtaining financial support for specific products in the pipeline may not underwrite firm-level financial stability if the investor's strategy is to fund a portfolio of products at various stages of development, rather than to invest in a particular firm.
If funding is complex and fragmented (see Fig 5) , exit strategies for equity investors are also variable and depend on the extent to which investment is in the firm as a whole or attached to specific products. It may be more difficult to exit if the investment is in the firm rather than a specific product contract and is not helped if capital market liquidity and the market valuation of a firm's equity deteriorate.
Partnering agreements and payments linked to specific products may boost a firm's market value but this may not be sufficient to encourage investor exit if realised market value is still below the value of the accumulated equity investment made in the firm. Capital market valuations are volatile and may either inflate or depress IPO funding, and put a brake on the supply of debt finance to private equity and hedge funds that depend on leveraging holding gains on the market value of equity investment relative to debt finance.
The bio-pharma innovation, capital market liquidity business model reveals the tension between the flow of funding, progress of product pipeline and the variable motivations of investors who are entering and exiting at various points along the product development value chain. Winners that invest in bio-pharma have lottery tickets stamped 'FDA approved'. Equity analysts assume that final approval even at phase III offers at best a 50-60% chance for a bio-pharma (Ernst & Young, 2008) In the following section, we employ our innovation, capital market liquidity Financialized bio-pharma business model to explore failure and success in three SME's: Ardana, Vernalis and Antisoma.
Bio-pharma SME cases: illustrating the innovation, capital market liquidity, business model
Of our three SME bio-pharmas, Ardana ceased trading in June 2008 going into administration, Vernalis downsized and restructured its business, backing a number of its products into partnerships to fund product in pipeline towards regulatory approval and Antisoma whilst carrying an accumulated deficit, is now running with a surplus as partnership milestone agreements start to pay off. Collectively our three firms reported accumulated loses of £684 million on equity investments of £767million and all have struggled to generate a positive return on invested capital for equity investors.
Ardana: up for sale but no buyers
The Board of Ardana has taken these steps after it became apparent that a possible refinancing or a possible sale or merger under discussion could not be table 1 ). These products were sold and marketed in the UK and near European countries through joint distribution arrangements but this success did not translate straightforwardly into strong financial performance because revenues from distribution deals were negligible and the company was rapidly burning balance sheet cash reserves. To quote Vernalis executive chairman Peter Fellner:
"It was clear that because we did not get Frova approved by FDA we had to make some radical changes. We had to reduce cash burn, which we have from £20m a year to less than £10m" (Jonathan Russell, Telegraph: 21 February
2008)
If the drug had been approved, Vernalis would have received a $40m (£20m) milestone payment from Endo Pharmaceuticals, its US partner. However, in a reversal of fortune, Vernalis now owed Endo $50m, paying $7 million in cash and agreeing to forego future royalties on US sales of Frovatriptan, and divesting product in pipeline to further slow its cash burn.
Vernalis said it would seek to divest Apokyn, its drug for Parkinson's disease, and of its US commercial operations. Analysts said share price movement indicated Vernalis was a strong takeover target. annual report that the strategy is to search and acquire promising early stage products and take these through towards regulatory approval "Our 'search-and-develop' business model is based on acquiring promising early stage product candidates from academic and commercial institutions. We then add value to these agents by designing and implementing effective programmes for pre-clinical development and the initial phases of clinical development. As our product candidates progress to late-phase trials, we actively seek pharmaceutical industry partners to complete clinical development, file for regulatory approval and carry out marketing activities". To finance acquisitions and progress product along the pipeline, Antisoma has regularly sought follow-on equity funding increasing issued share capital from 141 million to 835 million shares to raise roughly £100 million of additional equity finance. Another important asset from the Xanthus portfolio is oral fludarabine. This is a tablet formulation of a widely used chemotherapy drug for CLL, which is currently only available in the US as an intravenous formulation. A marketing application for oral fludarabine is being considered by the FDA.
http://www.antisoma.com/asm/ir/reports/rep2002/2002ar/2002ar.pdf?t=popup Antisoma continues to 'search, acquire and develop' new products for its pipeline where the objective is to limit R&D spending risk to equity investors, that is, avoiding investment in drug discovery but focusing instead on the development of promising prospects. As product moves along the pipeline, it is then possible to back these into partnership agreements that tend to generate 'lumpy' and erratic revenue patterns when milestones are met (see table 6 ). 
Summary
The productionist bio-pharma business model describes a long-term financial commitment by equity investors because the R&D spending process is driven by scientific discovery and clinical testing and development takes place over decades.
This productionist stereotype is used by policy makers and deployed by academics to describe innovation-led business models and how they might transform firm, industry and national competitiveness. The critical literature constructs an alternative financialized view where according to Lazonick (2008) , in an era of shareholder value, there is a tendency for firms to downsize and distribute rather than sustain R&D investment in innovation for firm and national competitiveness. Froud et al (2006) in their financialized account of strategy at GSK argue that managerial narratives promoted the promise of transformation from R&D spending and helped to boost analysts' short-run opinions about the share price. The financial numbers disclosed in GSK's annual report and accounts are used by Froud et al to construct an alternative narrative about the lack of financial transformation and productivity from R&D spending in an era where strategy is directed towards value creation for shareholders.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we construct a descriptive financialized bio-pharma business model and utilise this to explore how narratives about innovation and the productive outcomes of R&D spend conjoin with capital market conditions and demands of equity investors.
Our descriptive financialized bio-pharma business model is structured using three organising conceptual elements: narratives about performance, capital market conditions and the variable motivation of equity investors, where entry and exit possibilities matter.
Narratives about pipeline progress are important in the absence of sensible financial information (Froud et al, 2006) because this helps secure refinancing and increase the probability of follow-on funding from equity investors and receipts from partnership agreements in the form of milestone payments. Narratives about milestone achievements are also communicated to investment analysts who make recommendations about the firms share price and hence market value. Capital market conditions now take on added significance both in terms of the supply of funding, liquidity and market valuation because this facilitates entry and exit for equity investors. The identity of investors involved along the product pipeline changes from the original academics/university spinout equity holders to venture capitalists, partnership firms, private equity funds or Big-Pharma. The motivations of equity investors are variable, involving investment in the firm or into individual products that are at various stages of development along the pipeline, complicating market valuations because contractual arrangements are fragmented and complex.
The financialized bio-pharma business model shares many of the characteristics of other highly speculative sectors and tellingly The Times on 24 th January 2009 observed that the biotech sector is that corner of the stock market that most closely resembles a casino. The chances of success of an early-stage drug are unpredictable and financial loss is the most likely outcome. Pisano (2006b, p.119) observes that this is due in no small part to the 'profound and persistent uncertainty rooted in a limited knowledge of human biological systems and processes, mak(ing) drug R&D (a)
highly risky' process. The biotech business model that we describe in this article is a speculative innovation, capital market liquidity business model that depends on complementary narratives, capital market liquidity, risk appetite and appreciation of market values to facilitate entry and exit possibilities for equity investors to keep it all going. In contrast to more traditional productionist perspectives, we argue that this is not simply a business model capable of delivering productive transformation for the competitive economy.
